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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

EMANUAL 0. CHIMA, CHARLES
POWELL, and MRS. PEARL
POWELL,
Def endarnts-Appellarnts.

Cases
No.11639
No.11640

BRIEF 0 F RESPONDENT
1

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appeal from defendants' conviction for disturbing
nn assembly.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants were tried and convicted in Logan City
C'omt for disturbing an assembly and were fined $35.00
(•nch. They appealed to the District Court and were con,·icted by jury. They were sentenced to six months in
the Cache County Jail.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellee submits that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent stipulates to the facts as stated in appellants' brief with the following additions. Julia Brown
is also a negro (T.55). After she answered Mr. Chima's
question, she asked him to sit down so she could continue answering other questions, but he would not sit
down (T.26), and in fact began to raise his voice and
shout at her (T.47). At that point Mr. and 1\Irs. Powell
joined in and began yelling at Mrs. Brown, the speaker
(T.48). Mrs. Brown then attempted to read and answer
a written question ( T .48). She began to ask the writer
a question, but when she realized the writer to be Mr.
Powell, she withdrew her question (T.51). However, the
three defendants would not sit down with the result that
the meeting could not continue ( T .48).
Defendants were tried and convicted in the Logan
City Court and fined $35.00 each. On their appeal to
the District Court they were found guilty by the jury
and sentenced to six months in the county jail (T.160).
However, even before sentencing the defendants, the
District Court Judge extended leniency and clemency,
and said that it was not the intention of the Court that
any punishment be actually imposed on them (T.160).

2

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
SECTION 76-52-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, DOES NOT HAVE THE OBJECTIONABLE QUALITY OF VAGUENESS
AND OVERBREADTH, NOR WAS IT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO THE
DEFENDANTS.

It is elementary that in construing statutes they
he given a presumption of validity. This rule of construction also applies to state statutes falling within
the realm of protections and prohibitions on First
Amt>ndment freedom of speech matters. Fox v. State
of Washington, 236 U.S. 273 at 277 (1915) affirmed the
validity of a statute making the wilful printing of matter
Pncouraging a breach of the peace a misdemeanor and
in so doing the court stated, ''So far as statutes fairly
may be construed in such a way as to avoid doubtful
constitutional qul'stions they should be so construed:
l'nited States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
:3G6, 407, 408 (1908); and it is to be presumed that state
laws will be construed in that way by the state courts."
United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144
at 152 (1938), which is cited in appellants' brief, substantiates this point; only in a footnote does that court
say, '' 'l'here may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appl'ars on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments . . . . " However, the statute in question in the
ease at hand does not appear on its face to be within a
spPcific prohibition of the Constitution.
3

The statute attacked in the instant case is itself
concerned with the protection of the First Amendment
right of freedom of speech and assembly. Freedom of
assembly is a fundamental right not only to be protected
by the United States Constitution, but also by individual
state constitutions and statutes. Section 76-52-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, is such a statute. It is specifically
and unambiguously worded to protect freedom of assembly. The interplay of ideas brought about through
assemblies is essential to the proper functioning of our
democratic system. "It is beyond debate that freedom
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ''liberty assured
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.'' N.A.A.C.P.
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 at 460 (1958). By prohibiting
wilful disturbances of lawful assemblies, Section 76-52-1
of the Utah Code protects this fundamental freedom of
assembly.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
upheld the following statute as not being so vague and
indefinite as to make it unconstitutional:
''No person shall address any offensive,
derisive or annoying word to any other person
who is lawfully in any street or other public place,
nor call him by any offensive or derisive name,
nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence
and hearing with intent to deride, off end or annoy
him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful
business or occupation." Id. at 569.
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As this statute was held to be sufficiently narrowly
drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct
within the domain of state power, surely the statute
questioned in the instant case must also be so held.
A statute very similar to the one in question was
held in State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E. 2d 37
(1967) to be sufficiently definite and specific so as not
to violate limitations imposed upon the state by the
First Amendment. In that case the pertinent statute
read:
''If any person shall wilfully interrupt or
disturb any public or private school . . . either
within or without the place where such ... school
is held . . . he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, ... " Id., at 42.

Appellant in State v. Wiggins attempted to challenge
the constitutionality of the statute before the United
States Supreme Court, but a writ of certiorari was
denied. 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). Rather than protect
orderly conduct in schools, the statute in the instant
case can be said to protect an interest just as fundamental - that of freedom of assembly. A state in the
interest of protecting this right can impose reasonable
restraints on the exercise of speech and conduct by
persons who without authority of law, wilfully disturb
or break up lawful assemblies or meetings. The State
of Utah had the right to protect Julia Brown and the
persons attending the assembly. The statute in question
is desigued to afford this protection.

5

In construing statutes, words are to be given their
plain and ordinary meaning unless the context, or the
history of the state, requires otherwise. State v. Wiggins, supra. There is no word in Section 76-22-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, which when given its plain and
ordinary meaning can be said to be vague and overly
broad. The statute reads:
"Every person who, without authority of
law, wilfully disturbs or breaks up an assembly
or meeting, not unlawful in its character is guilty
of misdemeanor.''
The term "wilfully", as used in the statute, is
synonymous with "intentionally." 27 C.J.S. Disturbance
of Public
1 p. 818. The common meaning of
"disturb" can be found in Webster's Dictionary to mean
"to throw into disorder." The rest of the statute is
self-explanatory and the plain ordinary meaning of each
word is not vague.
The statute in question was not applied unconstitutionally to the defendants. The evidence shows that Mr.
and Mrs. Powell joined in with Mr. Chima and began
yelling at the speaker, refusing to sit down, with the
result that the meetillg could Hot continue (T.48). Thus,
the evidence does show that the three of them together
did disturb the meeting. The statute was not applied in
an arbitrary nor discriminatory manner to the defendants. The cases relied upon in appellants' brief to
substantiate their contention of an unconstitutional
application of the statute in qnestioll are easily distinguishable from the case at hand. Edwards v. South
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Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), dealt with a situation
where negroes peacefully assembled without any violence
or threats of violence on their part at the site of the
State Government and were arrested for a breach of the
peace when they did not disburse within fifteen minutes.

The facts of Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949) show that the guest speaker of a meeting in an
auditorium was arrested and charged with violation of
an ordinance forbidding any "breach of the peace."
'rlw Supreme Court of the United States held that the
ordinance violated the petitioner's right of free speech.
If Julia Brown (the guest speaker in the case at hand)
had been arrested rather than the defendants, the above
case may have beeu applicable, and .Julia Brown's right
to deliver her speech and conduct the assembly would be
protected from hecklers in the auditorium. But when the
defendants were convicted under Section 76-52-1, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, for disturbing Julia Brown's lawfully conducted assembly, it cannot be said that there
was a violation of any of their constitutional rights. On
tho contrary, they were convicted for violating the very
right of freedom of speech and assembly which Termini,ello v. Chicago, supra, sought to protect.
POINT II
UTAH STATUTORY LAW AND THE
CLEAR WEIGHT OF CASE AUTHORITY
ALLOW A DISTRICT COURT IN A CASE
TRIED ANEW FROM A JUSTICE OF THE
P:BJAC:BJ COURT TO INCREASE THE SEN-
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TENCE WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE.
All cases cited in Points III, IV, and V of appellants' brief for the authority that the District Court
violated the due process clause, and the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States and the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy are meaningfully distinguishable from the
instant case. Pa.tton v. State of North Carolina, 381 F.2d
636 (1967) held that where a harsher sentence was imposed following a second conviction for the same offense,
after the initial conviction had been vacated on constitutional grounds, it was a denial of equal protection
and a violation of due process not to credit the petitioner
for time served under the sentence imposed by the first
trial. In the present case the defendants have not served
any of the sentence imposed by the District Court, nor
are they likely to as the Judge extended leniency and
clemency to them (T.160).
Appellants cite only United States Supreme Court
cases and federal decisions as authority for their contentions in Points III, IV, and V. The long established rule
of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) that immunity from double jeopardy established in federal
decisions does not have to be applied through the Fourteenth Amendment to the States has recently been overruled in Benton v. Ma.ryland, 37 L.vV. 4623 (1969). In
that case the defendant was first tried on the charges of
hurglary and larceny. He was found not guilty of
larceny, but was convicted on the burglary count. Sub8

sequently, a Section of the Maryland State Constitution
was struck down and as a result the defendant's case
was remanded to be tried anew in the trial court. At this
second trial the defendant was again charged with both
larceny and burglary. This time he was found guilty of
hoth charges. The Supreme Court held this a violation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and held it applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, the instant case does not fall under the
holding of Benton v. Maryland. Rather, it falls within
the holding of State of North Carolina v. Pearce, 37 L.W.
4601 (1969). In that case the defendant's conviction in
his first trial was overturned on constitutional grounds.
\Vhen retried, he was convicted and sentenced to a prison
term, which, when added to his time already spent in
prison for that offense, was a longer total sentence than
that originally imposed. The court held that the defendant must be fully credited with the time already served
for the same offense, but also held that neither the
Double Jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection
Clause impose a bar on the trial judge in giving a more
severe sentence upon reconviction. The instant case falls
squarely within the holding. The district court judge
did have the authority to increase the sentence imposed
hy the justice of the peace. This has long been the established rule:
"And at least since 1919, when Stroud v.
United States, 251 U.S. 15, was decided, it has
been settled that a corollary of the power to retry
a defendant is the power, upon the defendant's
9

reconviction, to impose whatever sentence may be
legally authorized, whether or not it is greater
than the sentence imposed after the first conviction." 37 L.vV. 4601 at 4603.
The fact that in the instant case the district court
judge does havr the authority to increase the defendants'
Hentences is also in keeping with the prevalent philosophy
of modern penology. It is the duty of the sentencing
judge to consider a wide ambit of factors in arriving
at a just sentence. If he finds from these considerations
that defendant merits a harsher sentence, it should be
imposed, as the punishment should fit the offender and
not merely the crime.

Bott v. Bott, 22 Utah 2d 368, 453 P.2d 402 (1969) is
a recent decision of this court to be noted. That case
was a divorce proceeding where the husband was ordered
committed to the County Jail for five days ·when found in
contPmpt. The order was overturned by the Supreme
Court, and the trial court, hearing the same case on the
same mrrits, increased the sentence to fifteen days. It
was argued on appeal that increase in punishment deprived the appellant of equal protection, due process,
and violated his protection against double jeopardy.
But the court held that the appellant's contentions relating to "double jeojardy and unlawful increase in the
sentence are without merit.'' Id., at 403.
Defendants in the instant case appealed their action
from the justic0 of the peace court to the district court
under th0 authority of Sections 77-57-38, 77-57-39, and
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77-57-43, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Section 77-57-43,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, states that in an appeal duly
perfected from a justice of the peace court to a district
court the action shall be tried anew. Other states have
similar statutes, and the clear weight of case authority
shows that in a trial de novo from a city or justice of the
peace court the entire matter will be tried as if it were
being tried for the first time. ''Usually on the trial de
novo the court cannot exceed the limit of punishment
which the magistrate could have imposed, but may within that limit impose a lighter or a heavier penalty than
was adjudged below." 16 C.J .S. § 709 ( 9), p. 385. This
has been affirmed by numerous state decisions. The
Supreme Court of Wyoming has held:
''The motion to dismiss was made upon the
theory that the court might impose a larger penalty than that which had been imposed by the
justice of the peace. The court affirmed the fear
of counsel for defendant. But it had the right to
impose a larger penalty.'' State v. Fra;nklin, 70
Wyo. 306, 249 P.2d 520 at 522 (1952).
The only state to hold that in an appeal from a city
court to a district court the matter of sentencing shall
not be tried anew is the State of Louisiana. The Majority
Rule is set out explicitly by the Maryland court as follows:
''In other states, where a statute permits an
appeal from a magistrate to a court of superior
jurisdiction and directs that the case should be
heard de novo, it has been held consistently that
the upper court hears the case as if it were being
tried for the first time, and considers the entire
matter of verdict, judgment and sentence as
11

though there had been no trial below." Moulden
r. State of Maryland, 217 Md. 351, 142 A.2d 592
at 598 (1958).
That case cites numerous cases of other states with
similar holdings. That case was affirmed in Hobbs v.
State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963).

POINT III
A P P FJ LL AN T S WERE GRANTED
AND HA VE NOT SERVED
ANY SE}NTJ1JNCE; THUS, THEIR APPEAL
SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS THEY HAVE
SUFFERED NO INJURY.
It is a fundam<>ntal premise in law that where there
is no injury there can he no remedy. In the instant case,
the transcript shows that even before the district court
judgP sentenced the defendants, he granted them clemency (T.160). The defendants have suffered no injury;
they have not, nor are they going to serve any of the
sentence imposed upon them. The weight of case authority shmvs that eveu in instances where a defendant has
accepted a suspended sentence together with probation
or parole, he wains his right to appeal. 117 A.L.R. 929;
State v. Miller, 225
213, 34 S.E. 2d 143 (1945);
People, .. Boy('(:, 87 Cal. App. 2cl 828, 197 P.2d 842 (1948);
People v. Calf is, ;144 S.App. 539, 101 N.E. 2d 739 (1951).

The presPnt casP is even stronger for the proposition that the defendants waind their right to appeal
by accepting the clemeney granted by the trial judge.

The present defendants have not even the possibility of
complaining that in lieu of serving a sentence, they were
placed on probation or parole. They have been granted
clemency; it was the intention of the trial court judge
that no punishment ever be actually imposed. Their
appeal should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The defendants' convictions in the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah should not be set aside. The
statute under which they were convicted, Section 76-52-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is not vague or overly broad
on its face, nor was it unconstitutionally applied to the
defendants. Neither should the sentence of the District
Court be set aside. Utah statutes and the weight of case
authority show that it was within the District Court's
power to impose a heavier sentence as long as the sentl'nce did not exceed the limit of punishment which the
justice of the peace could have imposed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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